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Levy: Corporate Courtship Gone Sour: Applying a Bankruptcy Approach to

NOTE
CORPORATE COURTSHIP GONE SOUR:
APPLYING A BANKRUPTCY APPROACH TO
TERMINATION FEE PROVISIONS IN MERGER
AND ACQUISITION AGREEMENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Upon arriving on the foreign shores of ancient Mexico in 1519 with
hundreds of soldiers honeycombed with dissension and self-interest,
Hernn Cort6s, the infamous conquistador,' issued his first command. His
first directive immediately ordered the deliberate burning of the ships that
transported him and his army to the distant territory. His men watched as
their only means of retreat sank to the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico.3
With no practicable means of retreat, the only direction they could go was
forward.4 Historians explain that the purpose of Cort6s's order was to
1. Conquistador is a term used to identify a "military leader in the Spanish conquest of the New
World in the sixteenth century. Francisco Pizarro, the conqueror of Peru, and Hemdn Cortes, the
conqueror of Mexico, were the greatest of the conquistadors. The name is frequently used to mean any
daring, ruthless adventurer." at http:llwwv.infoplease.lycos.comce6/history/AOS13267.html Oast
visited Oct. 5, 2002). For a comprehensive historical review of the conquistadors, see generally PAUL
HORGAN, CONQUISTADORS IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY (1963).
2. See The Spanish Conquest of Mexico, at http://climbing.olycon.commexico/History.htm
(last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
3. See id.
4. The analogy of corporate takeovers to military engagements and conquests seems to
encompass much of the takeover vernacular. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d
255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that contests for corporate control have been ever more frequent
phenomena on the American business scene).
Waged with the intensity of military campaigns and the weaponry of seemingly
bottomless bankrolls, these battles determine the destinies of large and small
corporations alike. Elaborate strategies and ingenious tactics have been developed both
to facilitate takeover attempts and to defend against them. Skirmishes are fought in
company boardrooms, in shareholders' meetings, and, with increasing regularity, in the
courts.
Id.; see also Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (likening
the takeover landscape to military battles); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Corporate Defense Law for
Dispersed Ownership, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 12-13 (2001) (comparing hostile acquisitions to the
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impress upon the minds and hearts of his army that conquest is the only
option when all means of retreat are severed.5 The soldiers had no
practical choice but to go forward and conquer the foreign empire.
The notion that there is no going back has infiltrated the world of
mergers and acquisitions. Corporate lawyers acting in concert with
company executives have instituted mechanisms that virtually ensure the
consummation of a merger from the outset.6 Yet these transactions are
supposedly bound by the shareholders' legal and statutory right to vote in
approval or disapproval of a transaction.7 It has been argued that this
infrequent shareholder voting exercise has become meaningless due to
mechanisms that allegedly coerce their vote of approval."
Mergers and acquisitions are subject to competition as these
desirable transactions often attract several interested bidders that are
willing to compete for a target entity.9 The terms "target" and "bidder" are
commonly used in the field of mergers and acquisitions. Bidder refers to a
party making an offer to purchase or acquire control of a particular
corporation, the target.' When considering a potential merger, the
companies involved invest time, effort, and capital in order to determine
such factors as corporate compatibility and economic feasibility."
Tremendous financial resources are often devoted when pursuing such a
transaction.
Roman Empire, Charlemagne, the Great Discoverers and the colonial expansion of the seagoing
European powers and explaining how targeted societies could have done better if they had a defense
system akin to takeover defense mechanisms); Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison
Pill,
27 IOWA J. CORP. L. 381, 384 (2002) (describing the takeover environment of the mid-1980s as an
"era of open corporate warfare").
5. See The Spanish Conquest of Mexico, supra note 2. Interestingly enough, Cortds's father had
sent him off to school to become a lawyer but Corts felt that it was not interesting and subsequently
failed out. See id.
6. See Law Firms Report Record of M&A Activity for 1995, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
REPORT, Jan. 22, 1996, at 1996 WL 8300372 [hereinafter Law Finns Report]. There is, however, a
recent exception to this premise. In the recent merger battle between Hewlett-Packard and Compaq
Computer, dissident director Walter Hewlett is leading a political-like campaign against the merger.
Mr. Hewlett has spent tens of millions of dollars on advertisements to reach the 900,000 shareholders
that control the fate of the $22 billion deal. See Pui-Wing Tam & Scott Thurm, H-P Struggle Brings
Snasluouth Politicsto Corporate World, WALL. ST. J.,
Mar. 5, 2002, at Al.
7. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.03 (1999); see also PETER C. KOSTANT, BusINESs
ORGANIZATIONS 253 (1996). The legal voting rights shareholders possess and the problem of
shareholder coercion will be discussed in greater detail infra Part V.
8. See generally Brazen v. Bell At. Corp., 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997) (entertaining the argument
of a shareholder who claimed that the termination fee provision in the Bell Atlantic merger ultimately
coerced shareholders into voting in approval of the said transaction).
9. See, e.g., PowerStruggle, ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 1998, at 5.
10. See BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY 147, 1306 (5th ed. 1979).
I1. See Mark F. Hebbeln, Note, The Economic Case for Judicial Deference to Break-Up Fee
Agreements in Bankruptcy, 13 BANKR. DEv. J. 475,475 (1997).
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If a merger fails, a bidder may lose heavily in transaction costs
expended investigating the merger. 12 Moreover, a bidder can lose the
opportunity to profit from another strategic merger. 3 To minimize these
risks, bidders and targets frequently employ protective measures in the
form of a "deal protection" provision. 4 A deal protection provision is
broadly defined as "any contractual provision the effect of which is to
make a favored transaction more likely of consummation and less able to
be assailed by an interloper."' 5 Among these protective measures, one of
the most negotiated 16 measures is the implementation of termination fee
provisions into merger and acquisition agreements.
As will be discussed in greater detail in Part IT,a termination fee "is a
fee paid by the seller of a business to a potential acquiring party in the

event that a contemplated transaction is not consummated."'" While
termination fee provisions are central to acquisition agreements, they tend
to raise complex dilemmas. If courts examine the enforcement of
termination fee provisions deferentially, thereby facilitating combination
transactions, 9 the shareholders can potentially be left with one choice,
12. See Thomas A. Swett, Comment, Merger Terminations After Bell Atlantic: Applying a
LiquidatedDamagesAnalysis to Termination Fee Provisions,70 U. COLO. L. REv. 341,342 (1999).
13. See id.
14. See Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A FreshLook at Deal ProtectionDevices: Out
from the Shadow of the OmnipresentSpecter, 26 DEL J. CoRp. L. 975, 976 (2001) [hereinafter Deal
ProtectionDevices].
15. Id.at 977.
16. See Lou R. Kling et al., Summary ofAcquisition Agreements, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 807
(1997) (explaining that termination fees are the most negotiated provisions in acquisition agreements).
See also Law FirmsReport, supra note 6. "[Tlhere's little debate these days over break-up fees. When
lawyers sit down to negotiate, everyone at the table pretty much knows what's going to
happen .... Every buyer expects to get it, and every seller expects for it to be asked for." Id.
17. See Kling, supranote 16, at 807. There are several other types of deal protection provisions.
These include: No-Shop Provisions-provisions that thwart the ability of a target to shop around its
offer to other potential acquirers; No-Talk Provisions-provisions that prohibit the target from
negotiating with unsolicited bidders; Board Recommendation Covenants--covenants restricting the
ability of directors of a target to alter their recommendation to shareholders with respect to the exercise
of their statutory voting rights on the merger. See Frederick H. Alexander, Reining in Good Intentions:
Common Law Protections of Voting Rights, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 897, 899 (2001). Another deal
protection provision involves the issuance of stock options. These options afford the acquirer the right
to acquire a large amount of shares of a target company at a predetermined price, contingent on several
specific events occurring. Stock options are typically triggered when a termination fee provision is
triggered. See Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Process Based Model for Analyzing Deal
Protection Measures, 55 Bus. LAW. 1609, 1615 (2000) [hereinafter Process Based Model]. While
these are the most commonly used deal protection provisions, there is no definitive list of these
provisions "because the term describes a class of devices that is fluid, adaptable and bounded only by
the imagination of counsel." Deal ProtectionDevices, supra note 14, at 976.
18. Hebbeln, supra note 11, at 475.
19. The term "combination transaction" will be used interchangeably with the terms "merger"
and "acquisition."
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namely to approve the proposed transaction.20 Shareholders not wanting
the corporation in which they own stock to pay out an exorbitant
termination fee may be forced to exercise their vote in favor of
acquisitions that are not necessarily in their best interests or in the best
interests of the corporation.
Nevertheless, termination fees have become typical in the merger and
acquisition landscape.22 The economic issues surrounding these fees,
including incentives created by them, the opportunity costs of potential
purchasers in performing due diligence, and information costs,
collectively create compelling arguments to support judicial deference in
determining their validity. 23 These differing perspectives, economically

20. Depending on the size of a given deal this figure can potentially yield a quantitative pro-rata
loss to the shareholders. See Mark Lebovitch & Peter B. Morrison, Calling a Duck a Duck:
Determining the Validity of Deal Protection Provisions in Merger of Equals Transactions, 2001
COLuM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 45-46.
21. See id.; see also David Henry & Frederick F. Jespersen, Mergers: Why Most Big Deals
Don'tPay Off, Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 2002, at 60. Henry and Jespersen examined 1000 deals announced
between July 1, 1995 and August 31, 2001 worth at least $500 million and involving at least one
domestic corporation. The study concluded that "61% of buyers destroyed their own shareholders'
wealth ...The average return for all buyers was 4.3% below their peers and 9.2% below the S&P
500." Id. The cited reason for the loss in shareholder wealth was buyers paying too much and
transferring wealth to the seller's shareholders. "From the week before the deals to the week after,
sellers collected a hefty 19.3% extra return on their stock market value vs. their peers." Id. I am grateful
to Jamie Barber and Roland Estevez for bringing this study to my attention.
22. See Law Firms Report, supra note 6; see also John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A
Buy-Side Model ofM&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 315 (2000) (noting
that termination fees have been deployed in almost 70% of deals in 1998). Additionally, termination
fees have spread to foreign markets. In Australia, one journalist described the fees as "a sinister new
practice creeping into Australian takeovers ...[and further labeled the provisions a] penalty
agreement." Penalty Agreements Wrongfully Punish Shareholders,AUSTL. FIN. REV., Dec. 2, 2000, at
14. Australian merger regulators have attempted to cap the amount of termination fee provisions at 1%
citing shareholder concerns as the reason for the cap. See Brett Clegg, Takeover Panel Earns Its
Stripes,
FIN.
REV.,
Feb.
27,
2002,
available
at
http://afr.com/specialreports/reportl/2002/02/27/FFXYDG2Q1YC.html (ast visited Oct. 6, 2002).
Termination fee provisions have also been a topic of debate in the reformation of the London City
Code on Takeovers and Mergers. In a recent proposal, the Takeover Panel, the quasi-legislative body
that enforces takeover law and antitrust issues in the United Kingdom, adopted a rule that would limit
termination or break fees to one percent of the transaction offer price. See FRESHFIELDS, CHANGES TO
THE

CITY

CODE

ON

TAKEOVERS

AND

MERGERS,

available

at

http:/lwww.freshfields.comlpractice/corporate/publications/pdfs/changes.pdf
(July 2000) (last
visited Oct. 6, 2002); see also Will Break Fees Become the Nonn?, available at http://docs.tob-europa.com/jims/ukbreak.doc (last visited Oct. 6, 2002). In a recent Canadian merger between Clarica
Life Insurance and SunLife Financial Services, several major Clarica shareholders have vowed to
oppose the union because of the $195 million (C$310 million) excessive termination fee. This
termination fee is the largest in Canadian history (but most fees involving Canadian companies
generally range from 2% to 7% of a target's enterprise value). See Laura King, Canadian Insurers
Face ShareholderFight, DAiLY DEAL, Mar. 4, 2002.
23. See Hebbeln, supra note 11, at 476.
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inducing bidders and constraining shareholder choice, must somehow be
reconciled when termination fee provisions are under the judicial
microscope. The question of what standard should be applied when courts
examine termination fee provisions is still uncertain.24
This Note examines the Delaware judiciary's treatment of
termination fee provisions.2' The focus will center on the struggle between
the economic desire for judicial deference and the problems associated
with the potential absence of meaningful shareholder choice. Part II
describes the general risks and costs associated with combination
transactions and termination fee provisions. Part H discusses the
Delaware judiciary's doctrinal framework and the different legal standards
of review applied in evaluating these provisions. Part IV introduces the
liquidated damages approach to termination fee provisions that was
established in the seminal case Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp.2' Part V
discusses the shareholder's legal right to vote, the potential coercive effect
of termination fees, and the problems associated with the absence of
meaningful shareholder choice. Part VI comparatively assesses
termination fees in combination transactions to similar provisions in
bankruptcy asset-purchase agreements. The various standards of review
applied by bankruptcy courts are examined. Lastly, this Note suggests that
the best interest of the estate test, adopted by bankruptcy courts, that
inquires into the substance of the termination fee provisions, be adopted
and implemented analogously, by the Delaware judiciary.

24. See Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey, Lav and Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate
Transactions,10 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 1, 12 (2002) (explaining that the question of whether to apply
the business judgment rule or a more substantive standard to deal protection provisions, such as
termination fees, is yet to be determined by the Delaware Supreme Court); see also Deal Protection
Devices, supra note 14, at 976; ProcessBased Model, supra note 17, at 1627 (explaining that "there is
still ambiguity under Delaware law as to the relevant standard that should be applied in examining deal
protection measures").
25. While cases from other jurisdictions will be utilized, the main focus will be on Delaware
courts as Delaware has long been recognized as the leading jurisdiction in dealing with issues of
corporate law. See, e.g., DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS, ACQUIsrIONS, AND
REORGANIZATIONS 41 (1991). "Since the beginning of this century the tiny state of Delaware has been
the most popular jurisdiction of incorporation for multistate corporations. Almost half of our largest
five hundred corporations and almost a third of the corporations on the New York Stock Exchange are
Delaware corporations." Id.
26. 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
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II. TERMINATION FEE PROVISIONS IN MERGER AND
ACQUISITION AGREEMENTS

A termination or break-up fee27 is a fee paid by the target to the
acquiring party, the bidder, in the event that a contemplated transaction is
not consummated for reasons set forth in the acquisition agreement& The
fee is intended as a form of deal protection for the potential purchaser of
the business, who may invest a great deal of time and capital in the
process of appraising the target entity for the purpose of formulating an
accurate bid or offer. 9 Termination fee provisions have become "the most
hotly negotiated provisions in these acquisitions, 3 ° and are often expected
when negotiating a merger.
Termination fee provisions usually range from one to five percent of
the transaction's purchase price." Recent trends indicate that the amounts
of the fees in these provisions are increasing.33 Given the size of the
mergers of today, one to five percent of the purchase price is often a very
large financial commitment. The following chart illustrates the top twenty
pending transactions based on the size of the termination fees and the
aggregate percentage of the transaction purchase price for the years 2001
and 2002:14
27. The terms "break-up fee" and "termination fee" are one and the same and are often used
interchangeably.
28. See Hebbeln, supranote 11, at 475.
29. See id.
30. Kling, supra note 16, at 807.
31. See generally Law Firms Report,supra note 6.

32. See

SIMON M. LORNE, AcQuISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED

§ 2:23 (2001). The parameters of the amount of termination fees have been formed on
Delaware case law. In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., No. 17398, 1999 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 202 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999), the validity of a 6.3 percent termination fee was considered by
the Court of Chancery in the context for a request for preliminary injunctive relief. The court stated that
since it concluded that plaintiff had met their burden (by demonstrating a reasonable probability of
success on the merits), it would not address plaintiff's argument that the termination fee was unduly
coercive. See id. at *5.The court did, however, state in dicta that a 6.3 percent termination fee
"certainly seems to stretch the definition of range of reasonableness and probably stretches the
definition beyond its breaking point." Id. Part lIH.B infra will discuss the "range of reasonableness"
analysis articulated by the Delaware courts in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985).
33. See LORNE, supra note 32, at § 2:23; see also Coates & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 334.
For specific rates of termination fee incidence and the size of termination fees see Part V infra.
34. I am grateful to Jill C. Tydell, a mergers and acquisitions analyst at Dealogic, for providing
me with the data in this chart. Note that the time range of the 2002 figures is nine-months rolling,
ending October 14, 2002, and all the mentioned deals exclude buybacks. The merger of Hughes
Electronics and EchoStar was listed in this chart despite its recent failure to obtain regulatory
approval. The merger entailing a $600 million termination fee contingent on regulatory approval,
recently failed to obtain approval from the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC") on
grounds that the merger would cause "immediate and substantial" consumer harm. This was the first
TRANSACTIONS
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Target

Bidder

Pharmacia
TRW

Pfizer
Northrop
Grumman
Citigroup
Univision
Comm.
Dreyer's
Grand Ice
Cream
Guidant
Quest
Diagnostics
Veeco
Instruments
Del Monte
Foods
US Bancorp

Golden State
Bancorp
Hispanic
Broadcasting
Nestle SA (US
ice cream
business)
Cook Group
Unilab
FEI
HJ Heinz Co
Bay View
Capital Corp
AT&T
Hughes
Electronics

Comcast
EchoStar

Termination
Fee
($ million)

Transaction
Value
($ million)

7/15/02
2/22/02

1,600
275

62,011
12,882

Aggregate
Percentage
of Purchase
Price
2.6%
2.1%

5/21/02

235

5,880

4.0%

6/12/02

100

3,516

2.8%

6/17/02

75

2,353

3.2%

7/30/02
4/02/02

50
35

3,000
1,098

1.7%
3.2%

7/12/02

30

1,195

2.5%

6/13/02

20

2,806

0.7%

7/22/02

20

429

4.7%

7/06/01
8/03/01

1,500
600

71,950
29,173

2.1%
2.1%

Deal
Date

I

_I

time in thirty years the FCC voted to block a merger. See Yochi J. Dreazen & Andy Pasztor, FCC
Rejects EchoStar-HughesMerger, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2002, at A3. As of the publication of this
Note, the deal has not yet been formally withdrawn. The FCC will send its opinion on the merger to
an administrative law judge for review. If the parties do not withdraw the transaction, they will have
thirty days to file an amended application addressing the FCC's concerns. See id. Under federal
merger guidelines, the government wants to be convinced that a new competitor will be able to
compete in an industry within two years of a pending transaction. In its pursuit of obtaining the
blessing of federal antitrust regulators, EchoStar has agreed to help turn a third company,
Cablevision Systems Corp., into a viable competitor by providing it with proprietary technology, a
large swath of spectrum, and other concessions. See Andy Pasztor & John R. Wilke, EchoStar Tries
to Save Hughes Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2002, at A3. The determining factor in this respect is
whether the potential competitor, Cablevision, will be able to "launch its own satellite-television
business quickly enough to mollify antitrust enforcers." Andy Pasztor, Cablevision'sSatellite Plans
Are Key to EchoStar-Hughes,WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2002, at B13. Several Wall Street analysts,
satellite officials and antitrust lawyers are skeptical about Cablevision's ability to build a satellite
business fast enough to meet the federal guidelines. See id. The termination fee provision in this
transaction will likely be challenged if the deal is ultimately withdrawn. See Robert Frank & Andy
Pasztor, EchoStar Could Face Huge Breakup Fees, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2002, at CII.
Additionally, the acquisition of AT&T by Comcast, listed in this chart, recently passed regulatory
approval and will close in the near future.
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RWE

9/17/01

138

7,566

1.8%

P&O
Princess
Cruises
Nationwide
Financial

11/20/01

63

8,093

0.8%

8/08/01

55

1,560

3.5%

Enbridge

3/16/01

15

581

2.6%

WebLink
Wireless

Metrocall

4/02/01

12

477

2.5%

Yonkers
Financial

National
Bank of

11/14/01

4

61

6.5%

Water Works

Royal
Caribbean
Cruises
Provident
Mutual Life

Services

Midcoast
Energy
Resources

Greece-

Atlantic
Bank of
New York

Golf Trust of
America
Occam

Legends

2/28/01

3

113

3.0%

Accelerated

11/12/01

3

11

30.4%

Networks

Networks

In a typical scenario, one company places a bid on the target, and the
bid is accepted.35 The two entities reach a final agreement on the terms of
the acquisition, but prior to the closing of the transaction, a third company
offers a higher bid for the target company.36 The original bidder who
diligently pursues the expensive transaction sensibly seeks protective
provisions such as termination fees to shield it from exposure to such
situations; otherwise they risk expending a great deal of capital while
receiving nothing in return. 37

The payment of the termination fee is usually contingent on the
happening of certain triggering events. The most common triggers in
termination fee provisions include: (1) a breach of covenant,
representation, or warranty in a merger agreement; (2) failure to obtain the
35. See, e.g., LORNE, supra note 32, § 2:23.
36. See id. When the third party gains control of the target and breaks up the original bidder's
plan to acquire the target, this phenomenon is known as "deal-jumping."
37. Deal protection provisions potentially deter, and sometimes preclude, a competing bid. The
reason for this is when a termination fee is triggered, the cost of the target for the third party is raised in
accordance with the amount of the fee owed to the initial merger partner. See Charles M. Nathan,
Judgment Call: Deal Defense, DAILY DEAL, June 22,2001.
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requisite regulatory approvals; (3) failure to consummate the merger due
to a consummated transaction with a third party within a predetermined
period of time after an merger agreement is signed; and (4) the failure of
shareholders to vote in approval of the merger. When a termination fee is
triggered "solely in the event that shareholders were to vote against a
transaction, regardless of the presence or absence of a competing proposal,
or later consummation of such proposal" this is called a "naked no vote."39
Naked no vote provisions are the most difficult to reconcile as a policy
matter because payment of the termination fee undoubtedly burdens and
arguably coerces the shareholder vote, a legal right that is afforded to the
shareholders by statute.40 Alternatively, the effect such a provision would
have on the shareholder vote would depend on the proportionality of the
fee-if the amount is small then the effect on the shareholder vote may be
innocuous."
The cost of obtaining reliable information about a bidder or target is
an important consideration for all parties to a merger.42 The typical
acquisition agreement will include the target's representations concerning
the structure of the corporation as well as the information the bidder
uncovered while conducting due diligence.43 Due diligence will often
include the examination of financial statements disclosing liabilities,
financial holdings and assets, long-term sales and supply contracts,
pending litigation, tax compliance history, employee contracts, and
employee benefit plans.4 This diverse information requires expert
by investment bankers, lawyers and accountants.46
opinions
Consequently, termination fee provisions serve as insurance on the

38. See Process Based Model, supra note 17, at 1612; see also Deal Protection Devices, supra
note 14, at 981.
39. Deal ProtectionDevices, supra note 14, at 981.
40. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (affording shareholders the right to
vote when fundamental corporate changes occur). The coercive impact termination fee provisions have
on the shareholder franchise, specifically naked no vote provisions, will be discussed in greater detail
infraPart V.
41. See Alexander, supra note 17, at 908.
42. See, e.g., Hebbeln, supra note 11, at 494.
43. See Kling, supranote 16, at 782.
44. See id.
45. Note that the appraisal of a corporation is an increasingly complex inquiry that requires the
aid of a diverse pool of experts and extensive information. See e.g., Floyd Norris, Is $2 Billion Fair
Pay'mentfor a FiancdeLeft at the Altar?, N.Y. TiMAs, Nov. 5, 1999, at Cl.
46. See Hebbeln, supra note 11, at 494. "Due diligence includes, inter alia, checking loan
commitments, compliance with state and federal environmental laws, SEC compliance and conducting
title searches." Id. at 494 n.136.
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bidder's initial investment, namely the expense of obtaining information
and advice concerning the target.
Since the bidder will often incur substantial up-front costs in making
the initial offer, the initial bidder's risk of being rejected by a target can be
costly.4 ' Large corporations are no longer content to sit idle as competitors
enter strategic mergers. 9 These corporations will often present an
unsolicited bid to a target after a competitor announces merger prospects
with that same target. ° Indeed, one study of mergers involving
competitive bidding reveals that the second bidder is likely to win in a
"substantial majority" of merger contests."
Termination fee provisions serve several specific functions for
targets as well. For the target, the termination fee may be necessary in
order to attract serious bidders. 2 The target's willingness to offer a
termination fee as a guarantee to a would-be bidder may potentially attract
the bid of a "stalking horse." 53 By accepting a termination fee provision,
the target can demonstrate that it is receptive to the bidder's offer and
willing to proceed in good faith with negotiations. 54 The first bidder, or
stalking horse, will often attract other bidders who will then become in

47. In the current merger landscape, large corporations have been using mergers to gain
advantage within their industries. See, e.g., Constance L. Hays, Unilever Dealfor Bestfoods Signals
More Acquisitions, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2000, at CI (noting that through Unilever's acquisition of
Bestfoods to become the world's second largest food-maker, Unilever hopes to increase efficiency and
regain dominance in the food purchasing industry). This phenomenon, combined with the rapidly
increasing stock market values, has greatly increased the money invested and the price paid for
acquisitions. Thus, the transaction costs associated with these transactions, as well as the competition to
acquire, has partially led to a need for deal protections. See Richard G. Parker & David A. Balto, The
Merger Wave: Trends in Merger Enforcementand Litigation, 55 BuS. LAW. 351,356 (1999).
48. See generally Hebbeln, supranote 11.
49. See, e.g., Hays, supra note 47.
50. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Under the 'Mergerof Equals' Doctrine, Can a TargetBoardAlways
Favor a Friendly Suitor When a Second Bidder Makes a Higher, Unsolicited Offer?, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar.
30, 1998, at B5.
51. See Richard S.Ruback, Assessing Competition in the Marketfor CorporateAcquisitions, I1
J. FIN. ECON. 141, 147 (1983) (noting that second bidders prevailed in seventy-five percent of the
forty-eight cases examined). Often an auction will occur when directors decide to sell the corporation
to the highest bidder. In an auction, the target corporation will solicit bids and the highest bidder will
obtain control of the corporation. See 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER E. AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1041.50 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1994).
52. See Hebbeln, supra note 11, at 478.
53. See James A. Fanto, Breaking the Merger Momentum: Reforming CorporateLaw Governing
Mega-Mergers,49 BuFF.L. REV. 249, 323 (2001) (defining a "stalking horse" as a potential purchaser
who "invest[s] significant amounts of time and money, only to see another reap the benefits of the
transaction, and to lose the opportunity of competing transactions").
54. See Hebbeln, supra note 11, at 478 (noting that absent some guarantee to potential
purchasers that they will be reimbursed for their expenses, potential purchasers may be hesitant to
conduct the expensive due diligence required to properly value the target).
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effect, the "white knight."55 The stalking horse's offer is generally
considered to be the initial bid that is often then "shopped around" to
attract higher offers.56 Thus, the target may benefit from a termination fee
provision as it arguably provides a guarantee to potential bidders that
induces an initial bid. Furthermore, the initial bid can subsequently be
used to attract other more lucrative bids. The target can also protect its
own opportunities by requiring a termination fee that is reciprocal.5 7 If the
initial bidder becomes disinterested or pursues another course of action, it
may be required to pay the target for its time and potentially reducing its
opportunity to engage in a merger with another corporation.58
It is important to note however, that these economically based
assertions are disputed. As will be discussed in Part VI, Professor Markell
contends that termination fees are often unnecessary to induce bidders.
Markell argues from an economic standpoint that a target can eliminate
the need for termination fees by increasing the available information about
itself. Moreover, what will induce a bidder is the incentive and prospect
that the transaction will ultimately benefit the bidder in the future and 5not
9
the prospect of being immediately compensated for due diligence CoStS.
In sum, the bidder and the target face a considerable risk that the
merger will not consummate due to, among other things, the likelihood of
subsequent bidders. Accordingly, it is important for merger partners to
protect their investments by minimizing the aforementioned risks.

III. TERMINATION FEE PROVISIONS IN DELAWARE JURISPRUDENCE
Termination fee provisions are subject to judicial examination and
are at times held unenforceablei 0 For instance, termination fees may be
invalidated if they are "part of the overall plan to thwart" another bidder's

55. The term "white knight" has been defined "as a potential acquirer usually sought out by the
target of an unfriendly takeover to rescue it from the unwanted bidder's takeover." ROBERT v.
HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 488 (3d ed. 1991).
56. See hI re Integrated Res., Inc., 135 B.R. 746, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd sub non
Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. 650 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992) (quoting In re Marrose Corp., Nos. 89B 12171-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[Termination] fees
may encourage the making of what is colloquially referred to as a 'stalking horse' offer, which is an
initial bid that is then 'shopped around' to attract higher offers").
57. See, e.g., Brazen v. Bell At. Corp., 695 A.2d 43,45 (Del. 1997).
58. See Process BasedModel, supra note 17, at 1613.
59. See Bruce A. Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J.

349,386 (1992).
60. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, (Del. 1986)
(analyzing a termination fee and holding that it was enforceable because it intended to prevent
acquisition of the target company).
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efforts,6' or they may be upheld as valid liquidated damages clauses. 2 This
Part assesses the various standards of review Delaware courts apply in
their examination of termination fee provisions.63
As termination fee provisions surface in the combination transaction
landscape, courts have analyzed their validity by applying several
different standards. When contemplating combination transactions,
directors require flexibility to make the difficult and often complex
decisions associated with such transactions. 4 Directors are charged with
maximizing the price to be attained for the shareholders. 65 This
requirement only manifests on certain occasions. Once it becomes evident
that a corporation will be acquired, the duty of the board shifts from the
preservation of the corporate entity to maximization of the price to be
realized by the shareholders. 66 It is in the best interests of the shareholders
of the target corporation to receive the highest value for their stock.6 The
Delaware courts have struggled to articulate a legal standard that
appropriately conforms to directors' business decisions in their quest for
maximization of the price obtained for the shareholders. 8 The traditional
standard that courts apply is the business judgment rule.69

61. Id. at 184.
62. See generally Brazen v. Bell At. Corp., 695 A.2d 43,45 (Del. 1997).
63. Compare Brazen, 695 A.2d at 43 (holding that a liquidated damages analysis should be
applied to termination fee provisions), with Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Inc., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985) (adopting a reasonableness/proportionality standard to defensive measures adopted by directors
in contests for corporate control).
64. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181.
65. See id. at 182.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See supra note 63.
69. See William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in
Delaware CorporationLaw, 56 Bus. LAw. 1287, 1295 (2000). Directors traditionally use the business
judgment role as a defense in a shareholder's suit for damages arising out of an act or omission by the
director in his or her managing capacity. See Alexander, supra note 17, at 899. This concept of judicial
deference to directors' business decisions originated in an 1829 Louisiana Supreme Court decision,
Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829). In Millaudon, the plaintiff sought to hold a bank
director liable for the bank president's misconduct. The court used a protective standard to evaluate the
director's conduct and refused to impose liability. See id. at 73-78, 94. After Millaudon, other
jurisdictions invoked the rule. See, e.g., Godbold v. Branch Bank, I1 Ala. 191, 199-201 (1847)
(holding that the rule protects directors from personal liability for good faith mistakes unless the errors
are grossly wrong as to show fraud or lack of knowledge); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 3 R.I.
9, 18 (1853) (holding that the directors were not personally liable because they acted in good faith,
exercising ordinary care and prudence, and in the best interests of the corporation).
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A.

The Business Judgment Rule

Under the business judgment analysis, if directors can demonstrate
that they made a business decision on an informed basis, in good faith,
and without self-interest, the courts will respect the board's decisions
without holding the directors liable for unanticipated losses.70 The
Delaware Supreme Court has held that under the business judgment rule,
director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.7'
Consequently, in the context of a merger, courts have examined the board
of directors' conduct under a gross negligence standard when deciding
whether it acted in an informed and deliberate manner in determining
whether to approve an merger agreement before submitting the proposal
to the shareholders. Although this analysis has been frequently applied
and accepted, it is not entirely clear how it functions in today's merger
environment, and particularly in the context of termination fee
provisions. 3
Under such an analysis, judicial review has generally been limited to
a procedural one, namely, the process by which the directors make the
decision regarding the inclusion of the termination fee in an acquisition
agreement. 74 Inherent in the business judgment analysis is "the protective
thrust of the business judgment rule on limiting judicial scrutiny of the
substance of the directors' decision."75 The notion of the business
judgment rule calls for deferential judicial examination of the substance of
the directors' decision while focusing on the process the directors used in
arriving at the determination.76 Accordingly, this limited deferential review
almost always leads to a result in which the termination fees are found
valid. 7
70. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984).
71. Seeid.
72. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
73. See Process Based Model, supra note 17, at 1634-35 (noting that there is a tension when the
deferential standard of the business judgment rule is applied to protective measures because such
measures "could nullify as a practical matter the requirement that mergers be subject to shareholder
approval"). Because of the inconsistency associated with the application of the business judgment rule,
the authors explain that a certain answer must await further decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court.
See id. at 1635.
74. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at '-8 (Del. Ch. June
24, 1991) (describing the process oriented approach of the business judgment rule as the "objective
review of the process by which [the board] reached the decision").
75. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided
Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 287,301 (1994).
76. See id. at 302.
77. The business judgment rule promotes several identifiable policies. First, the rule encourages
informed risk taking by directors because it shields them from personal liability for honest, good faith

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 30:1361

The EnhancedScrutiny of Unocal

Academics and practitioners alike have criticized the business
judgment rule as a legal standard because of its lenient stance in finding
the directors of a corporation liable. s Indeed, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum, Inc., 9 the Delaware Supreme Court addressed these concerns
by enhancing the judicial analysis in the combination transaction context.
The court's enhancement of judicial scrutiny resulted from the fact that
directors face an "inherent conflict" in situations that contemplate a
change of control and the "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
,,80
shareholders ....
In Unocal, the court held that when directors cause a corporation to
take defensive actions, the court must determine whether those directors
reasonably perceived a threat to the corporation, and further, whether the
defensive actions constituted a proportionate response to that threat.8' If
directors fail to act reasonably and proportionately, the court will apply
the entire fairness standard of review, which will likely result in enjoining
the directors' actions. 2 Alternatively, if the directors survive the enhanced
scrutiny, the deferential business judgment rule will apply and the
defensive actions will almost always be allowed.83

decisions. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that investors can
diversify their portfolios to minimize their risks, and, therefore, an overly careful approach by directors
seeking to minimize their risk instead of maximizing gain is not in the best interests of investors).
Secondly, the application of the business judgment rle discourages courts from reviewing business
decisions in hindsight. See id at 886 (recognizing that an entrepreneur's function is to make reasoned
decisions with less than perfect knowledge). Lastly, the business judgment rule prevents courts from
reviewing the substance of business decisions, a task for which they are not equipped. See Weiss v.
Temp. Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 941 (3d Cir. 1982).
78. See Gevurtz, supra note 75, at 288.
79. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The Court upheld a discriminatory self-tender by the target
corporation to all its shareholders, other than the bidder, at a premium which effectively gave a
dividend to all shareholders, except the bidder, and thus forced the bidder to call off its offer. However,
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld this tactic, which is now prohibited by SEC rule, only after
finding that the offer was coercive and that the bidder had a reputation as a greenmailer. A
"greenmailer" is defined as one who refers to a payment by the target to a potential aggressor to
purchase at a premium over market shares that have been acquired by the aggressor. The acquirer in
exchange agrees not to pursue its takeover bid. See HAMILTON, supra note 55, at 462.
80. Unocal,493 A.2d at 954-55.
81. See id.; see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372 n.9 (Del. 1995)
(explaining that Unocal's enhanced standard of review is proper whenever the record reflects "that a
board of directors took defensive measures in response to a perceived threat to corporate policy and
effectiveness which touches upon issues of control").
82. The "entire fairness standard" is discussed more fully infra Part III.C.
83. See Unocal,493 A.2d at 985.
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The Unocal analysis began by establishing that directors have a
"fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise" and
that their fiduciary duty extends to protecting the corporation and its
shareholders from perceived harm.Y The court further noted that while
directors have this duty to protect the corporation, they do not have
"unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian
means available." 5 The court feared that directors, while claiming to take
defensive action against threats to the corporation, might simultaneously
be warding off unsolicited bidders based on self-interest.86 The selfinterest concern is that an unsolicited bidder may not want to perpetuate
the target's directors in office; therefore, the target's directors seek to
entrench themselves in their position as directors." Thus, the court
articulated the reasonableness/proportionality test in hopes of minimizing
the possibility of director entrenchment self-interest. 8
In connection with the reasonableness/proportionality framework, the
Delaware Supreme Court has established a two-part analysis. 9 The first
part looks to determine whether a particular defensive measure is
"draconian."9 A measure is deemed to be "draconian" if it is either
preclusive or coercive. 9' Second, once the defensive measure is not
deemed to be "draconian," the focus is shifted on whether the defensive
measure falls within a "range of reasonableness," with proper recognition
of the board's need for "latitude in discharging its fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholders when defending against perceived
threats. 92 Once the board of directors fulfills its burden, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the plaintiffs to rebut the presumptions of the business
judgment rule discussed earlier.93

84. Id. at 954.
85. Id. at 955.
86. See id.
87. See id. For a lucid discussion of the self-interest concern, see Allen et al., supra note 69, at
1290, explaining that "corporation law has always been concerned with corporate control and, in
particular, with whether directors have acted to advance their personal self-interest by entrenching
themselves in office." Id. at 1290 & n.7 (citing Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001, 1009 (Del. Ch. 1987),
where the court explained the roots of this concern: "Almost from the earliest stirrings of a distinctive
body of law dealing with corporations, courts have been alert to the dangers posed by structures that
permit directors of a corporation, by reason of their office, to control votes appurtenant to shares of the
company's stock owned by the corporation itself .....
88. See Unocal,493 A.2d at 955.
89. See generallyUnitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
90. See id. at 1387.
91. See id. at 1387-88.
92. Id. at 1388.
93. See id. at 1390.
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Under this enhanced scrutiny framework, Delaware courts have
enjoined defensive measures if they are "coercive in that they leave
shareholders with no rational choice but to accept the alternative presented
by the board," or if they are "preclusive responses that bar shareholder
choice by denying them the opportunity to receive offers." 94 It is still
unclear whether such enhanced scrutiny is triggered in the context of
termination fee provisions that are protective and not necessarily defensive
measures.
Mark Lebovitch and Peter Morrison recently argued that the
Delaware Court of Chancery cases indicate that deal protections, such as
termination fees, should be subject to enhanced scrutiny. 9 They argue that
deal protections should be subject to the same enhanced scrutiny as
defensive measures as it promotes an appropriate balance of power
between the directors and shareholders, preventing a coercive shareholder
vote.96 Lebovitch and Morrison conclude that even outside of an actual
threat by a competing bidder, deal protection provisions are inherently
defensive in nature and should be evaluated under Unocal enhanced
scrutiny as opposed to deferential business judgment review. 9'
In a recent article, Professor Mark Lowenstein contends that
Delaware jurisprudence under Unocalreveals that "the Delaware Supreme
Court has been reluctant to interfere with board decisions" and further,
"[i]n no case has the Supreme Court held that a defensive maneuver was

94. Gregory W. Werkheiser, Comment, Defending the CorporateBastion: Proportionalityand
the Treatment of Draconian Defenses From Unocal to Unitrin, 21 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 103, 109 (1996).
Under a poison pill plan,
companies typically declare a dividend on its common stock that consists of rights to
purchase common stock or a new series of preferred stock at a price equal to the
estimated long-term value of the common stock. The exercised price is roughly three to
five times stock's current value.
CFO.com, Latest Tech Trend: Poison Pills, at http:llwww.cfo.comlarticle/l,5309,3210,00.html (May
17, 2001) (last visited Aug. 21, 2002). The plan also works by becoming
exercisable once a third party acquires or offers to acquire a stake typically beyond 15
percent of the company's stock. It dilutes the new stake of the interloper because rights
holders who exercise their rights generally pay the exercise price but get two shares for
each right. The potential acquirer does not hold such rights.
Id. Martin Lipton, a takeover specialist at the New York law firm of Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz,
created the poison pill. See Craig Schneider, Prominent Takeover Lawyer Martin Lipton Warns of
Hostile Takeover Activity, available at http://cfo.comlArticle?article=%202254 (Mar. 14, 2001)
(last visited Aug. 21, 2002). For a recent comprehensive study on the poison pill and its illustrious
history, see generally Velasco, supranote 4.
95. See Lebovitch & Morrison, supra note 20, at 6.
96. See id. at 15-16.
97. See id. at 46.
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disproportionate to the threat posed.""8 On similar grounds, Professors
Thompson and Smith argue that the actual cases decided under the Unocal
standard, "reflect a much more passive judicial role that seems to distrust
shareholder decision-making and to prefer that of directors.""
This Note endeavors to conclude that greater scrutiny is required
particularly when termination fee provisions are under judicial
examination. The inadequacies of the "enhanced" Unocal standard has led

to mounting judicial discontent as well as considerable academic
commentary highlighting its deficiencies.' As will be discussed, the
standard that should be adopted must broadly consider the totality of the
circumstances and not merely involve perceived threats to corporate
policy as the Unocal decision contemplates.
C.

The Entire FairnessStandard

Where the business judgment rule is the governing standard, the rule
"prevents substantive review of the merits of a business decision"10 1 and
requires that courts "decline to evaluate the merits or wisdom of the
transaction."' 02 By contrast, if a self-dealing board'0 3 has made a decision,
the protection of the business judgment rule is removed.0 4 The board,

98. Mark J. Loewenstein, Unocal Revisited: No Tiger in the Tank, 27 J. CORP. L. 1,2-3 (2001).
Additionally, in Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quicklurn Design Systems, Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 40 (Del. Ch.
1998), the Delaware Chancery Court held that the enhanced Unocal standard is not onerous in practice
since the standard ofjudicial review is one of reasonableness and not perfection.
99. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the ShareholderRole:
"SacredSpace" in CorporateTakeovers, 80 TEx. L. REv. 261,262 (2001).
100. See, e.g., Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 324 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that "this
case unavoidably brings to the fore certain tensions in our corporation law"); In re Gaylord Container
Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("Unocal's purpose and application have
been cloaked in a larger, rather ill-fitting doctrinal garment."). For academic criticism of the Unocal
standard, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills,Deadhand Pills, and ShareholderAdopted Bylaws: An Essayfor Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 511, 516 (1997) (criticizing the
Unocal analysis as "reduc[ing] the scope of judicial monitoring of the board's fiduciary
responsibilities"); see also Loewenstein, supra note 98, at 2-3; Thompson & Smith, supra note 99, at
262 (arguing that the Unocalstandard does not resolve shareholder-director disputes satisfactorily).
101. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770,780 (Del. Ch. 1988).
102. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986).
103. A self-dealing transaction or decision is when the directors, that owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation, transact when they have "a personal interest that might conflict with the interest of the
party to whom she owes a fiduciary duty." JA, ES E. CLAPP, WEBSTER'S DICIIONARY OF THE LAW
391 (2000).
104. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995) (holding that if a
self-dealing fiduciary cannot demonstrate that the transaction was at an entirely fair price, the fiduciary
will be liable and there is no business judgment defense).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1361

under the entire fairness standard, must then prove that the merger
transaction was a product of both "fair dealing"'' 5 and "fair price."' 6
Fair dealing "embraces questions of when the transaction was timed,
how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and
how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained."'0 7
Fair price "relates to the economic and financial considerations of the
proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value,
earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic
or inherent value of a company's stock."'0 8
It is important to note, however, that the protection of the business
judgment rule is almost always invoked.'9 Proper invocation of the
standard of review is extremely important because the realm of possible
liability in entire fairness cases, as opposed to business judgment rule
cases, is considerable." 0
IV.

BRAZEN V. BELL ATLANTIC: A LIQUIDATED DAMAGES ANALYSIS

In 1995 Bell Atlantic Corporation and NYNEX Corporation entered
into merger negotiations."' In order to protect their investments of time,
capital, and opportunity costs, the parties drafted an agreement that
provided for reciprocal termination fees. ' 2 The provision was designed to
protect both parties in the event the merger would not consummate." 3 If
either party failed to obtain shareholder approval or terminated the

105. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Gevurtz, supra note 75, at 288. But see Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 392 A.2d 1233
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), aff'd, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. App. 1981) (finding the defendant, an
estate of a deceased director, liable as the corporation went bankrupt as a result of egregious financial fraud perpetrated by its officers); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)
(holding the directors of a publicly held corporation liable for breaching their duty of care in approving a sale for cash without considering the possibility of other proposals at higher prices). Note
that the key to the holding was that because the directors failed to inform themselves or seek expert
advice, they could not claim protection of the business judgment rule for an uninformed judgment.
110. See Cinerama,663 A.2d at 1162.
111. See Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 45 (Del. 1997). The merger discussions took
place on the heels of the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996-the enactment of which, the
parties concluded, had transformed the competitive landscape. The parties, therefore, viewed their
opportunities to merge with other telecommunications companies as limited because of the many
mergers that were being proposed by competitors, thus, limiting future business combinations. See id.
at 47. "The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ... allowed the regional Bell operating companies ... to
enter new areas of business .... Brazen v. Bell Al. Corp., No. 14976, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 44, * 10.
112. See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 45.
113. Seeid.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss4/7

18

Levy: Corporate Courtship Gone Sour: Applying a Bankruptcy Approach to
20021

TERMINATION FEE PROVISIONS

agreement, that party would be required to pay the other party $200
million."' Additionally, if either party consummated a competing
transaction within eighteen months of the agreement, that party would be
required to pay an additional $350 million to the unfulfilled partner."5 The
parties included a statement in the merger agreement explaining that the
termination fees "are an integral part of the transactions contemplated
' " 6by
penalty."
a
not
and
damages
liquidated
constitute
and
this [a]greement
In response to the Bell Atlantic Merger with NYNEX, plaintiffShareholder, Lionel Brazen, filed a class action against Bell Atlantic and
its directors for declaratory and injunctive relief.' 7 Brazen argued that the
termination fee provision was not a valid liquidated damages clause
because "it failed to reflect an estimate of [the] actual expenses incurred in
preparation for the merger."".8 Additionally, he argued that the $550
million fee was an "unconscionably high" termination fee, employed "to
restrict and impair the exercise of the fiduciary duty of the Bell Atlantic
board and coerce the shareholders to vote to approve the proposed
merger."" 9 Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.' 20 The
Delaware Court of Chancery rejected Brazen's arguments and upheld 2the
termination fee provision under the deferential business judgment rule.1 '
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the lower court on different grounds.' Unlike the Chancery Court, the
Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the termination fee provision as a
liquidated damages clause rather than applying the business judgment
rule.' The court reasoned that the parties themselves expressly intended
that the termination fee be treated as liquidated damages. 2 4 Relying on
Kysor Industrial Corp. v. Margaux, Inc.,'2 the court applied a liquidated
damages analysis. 6
114. See id.
115. Seeid.
116. Id.at46 (emphasis omitted).
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
at46-47 (footnote omitted) (quoting Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., No. 14976, slip op. at I
(Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 1997)). Brazen argued that regardless of what the shareholders believed about the
merits of the transaction, they all realized that by voting against the merger they would be imposing an
exorbitant $550 million fee on their company. See id. at 49.
120. See id. at 47.
121. Seeid.
122. See id. at 50.
123. See id. at48.
124. See id.
125. 674 A.2d 889 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (upholding a termination fee provision to be paid as
liquidated damages).
126. See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 48.
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To be valid, a liquidated damages' 27 clause must survive a twopronged test.' First, the damages resulting from the breach must be
"uncertain or incapable of accurate calculation.' 29 Second, the estimated
damages must be a reasonable forecast of the actual damages and not "a
penalty ,intended
to punish the stockholders ...for not approving the
3
merger.'
The court held that the termination fee provision was valid under the
standard liquidated damages analysis.' 3' The court noted, that "'[w]here
the damages are uncertain and the amount agreed upon is reasonable, such
an agreement will not be disturbed.",132 In analyzing the first prong of the
test, that the damages must be uncertain, the court held that calculating
damages in this specific instance was a "near impossibility."'' 33 The court
reasoned that the telecommunication industry was experiencing volatile
and uncertain times, due to the ratification of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. 34 As a result of the changes in competitiveness of the
telecommunications arena, 13 damages resulting136from a breach of the
merger agreement would be difficult to calculate.
In analyzing the second prong, whether the fees were reasonable, the
court was influenced by two factors: first, each party's anticipated loss
should the merger not occur, and second, the difficulty of calculating the
37
IOSS. The court noted that in order to fail the second prong of the test, the
amount "must be unconscionable or not rationally related to any measure
of damages a party might conceivably sustain."' 38 Ultimately, the court
validated the $550 million termination fee that amounted to two-percent of

127. Liquidated damages are damages for a breach of contract for a predetermined amount stated
in the contract, "where the parties agreed at the time of contracting on a reasonable figure or formula
for determination of the compensation to be paid in the event of a breach." CLAPP supra note 103, at
123.
128. See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 48.
129. Id. The greater the difficulty of calculation, the greater the likelihood the liquidated damages
provision will be found reasonable.
130. Id. Note that this two-prong analysis is seemingly paradoxical. On the one hand courts insist
that the damages be uncertain, while altematively, the stipulated damages must be a reasonable forecast
of what the damages would be.
131. Seeid. at49.
132. Id. at 48 (footnote omitted) (quoting Lee Builders v. Wells, 103 A.2d 918, 919 (Del. Ch.
1954)).
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 45.
136. See id. at 48.
137. See id.
138. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Bell Atlantic's market capitalization. 3 9 The court noted that the
termination fee fell within the range of other termination fee provisions
previously upheld by Delaware courts.'4°
The court proceeded to summarily dismiss the shareholder coercion
argument, observing that coercion did not arise because shareholders
knew that their rejection of the merger would trigger the payment of the
fee.' 4' Relying on Williams v. Geier,'42 the court noted that shareholder
coercion occurs only when the alleged coercive action is designed to
obtain shareholder 43approval of a transaction that is not based on the merits
of the transaction.
The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion is flawed in several respects.

The court failed to adequately address the Chancery Court's reasoning for
refusing to apply a liquidated damages analysis to termination fees in

merger agreements. To this effect Vice-Chancellor Chandler opined
"[tihat the Merger Agreement refers (once) to the termination fees as
'liquidated damages' does not change the fact that the event which

triggers payment of the fees is not a breach but a termination. Liquidated
damages, by definition, are damages paid in the event of a breach."'" The

triggering of a termination fee provision is not necessarily a result of a
breach of the merger agreement, rather a contemplated protection that

mitigates the effects of nonconsummation of a given transaction.
Another inconsistency in the Supreme Court's opinion is in the
court's discussion of coercion. The court defined coercion as "actions
which have the effect of causing the stockholders to vote in favor of the
proposed transaction for some reason other than the merits of that

transaction."'

45

Immediately thereafter, the court stated that termination fee

provisions were "an integral part of the merits of the transaction.'

46

Under

139. See id. at 49.
140. See id. at 49 & n.17 (citing Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Margaux, Inc., 674 A.2d 889, 897 (Del.
Super. Ct 1996); Lewis v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., No. 8720, slip. op. at 6 (Del. Ch. May 16, 1990);
Roberts v. Gen. Instrument Corp., No. 11639, slip op. at 21 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990); Braunschweiger
v. Amer. Home Shield Corp., No. 10755, slip. op. at 19-20 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989)).
141. See id. at 50. A discussion of shareholder coercion .vill follow infra Part V.
142. 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
143. See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 50 (stating that the reciprocal termination fee provisions that were
drafted to protect both corporations in the event the merger was not consummated, were an integral part
of the transaction). Further, the court noted that although the termination fee provision may have
influenced the shareholder vote, there was 'no structurally or situationally coercive factors' that made
an otherwise valid fee provision impermissibly coercive in this setting." Id. (footnote omitted).
144. Brazen v. Bell Ad. Corp. No. 14976, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 44, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19,
1997), affd on othergrounds, 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997) (footnote omitted).
145. Brazen, 695 A.2d at50 (quoting Williams, 671 A.2d at 1382-83).
146. Id.
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this "circular" definition it is unlikely
that a termination fee provision will
47
ever fail such a coercion test.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's reasoning for applying a
liquidated damages analysis centered on the fact that the parties intended
to have the terminated fee treated as such. 4 1 Conditioning the judicial
analysis of termination fee provisions on the characterization of the fee in
a particular merger agreement hopelessly neglects to take into account the
underlying policies that Delaware courts are responsible for
administering-namely, informed and responsible directorial action and
protecting the value and voting rights of shareholders. Allowing the
parties to a merger agreement to dictate
49 the standard of judicial review
objectives.
policy
these
achieves
hardly
A.

Brazen as a Possible Prelude to Enhanced Scrutiny

Prior to Brazen, other non-Delaware courts had implemented
different approaches in analyzing termination fee provisions.
r 150For instance,
in CRTF Corp. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., rather than
applying the traditional business judgment analysis, the New York court
held that termination fees are valid only if they enhance rather than stop
the process of bidding.' Other courts rejected this analysis in favor of one
that is similar to Unocal, holding that such fees are valid when they are
reasonable in relation to the bidder's efforts and to the size of the
transaction.' Thus, it is evident that the courts have established the
groundwork for some form of enhanced scrutiny in the examination of
termination fees, as the deference afforded by the business judgment rule
is seemingly inadequate.

147. See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 333. Professors Coates and Subramanian also
point out that the court's discussion of shareholder coercion suggests that termination fee provisions
will unlikely be invalidated as interfering with shareholder voting rights under a Blasius Industries,Inc.
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), analysis which held that directors cannot act with the
primary motivation of impairing shareholder voting without a compelling justification. See id. at 332.
The Professors argue that the Brazen court's definition of coercion "eviscerated this test" from the
context of termination fee provisions. Id.
148. See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 48.
149. In the same respect, the Delaware Supreme Court fails to mandate a liquidated damages
analysis for all termination fee provisions considered by the court. See generally id.
150. 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
151. Seeid. at440.
152. See Cottle v. Storer Comm., Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 578-79 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding a
termination fee provision representing a little over one percent of the total acquisition price); see also
Beebe v. Pac. Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1150 (D. Or. 1984) (adopting a reasonableness test in
upholding a termination fee payable if the shareholder failed to ratify the transaction).
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With regard to the application of the liquidated damages analysis
rather than the deferential business judgment rule, the Brazen court
1 53
emphasized that, "[t]his is not strictly a business judgment rule case."
Furthermore, the court explained that "it [was] appropriate to apply a
reasonableness test, which in some respects is analogous to some of the
heightened scrutiny processes employed by [Delaware] courts in certain
other contexts."'' Thus, the Brazen opinion seems to open the proverbial
door for termination fee provisions to be examined by applying a standard
that incorporates some kind of enhanced scrutiny as this Note advocates.
The court, however, did not define precisely what standard should govern
the examination of termination fee provisions.

V. THE SHAREHOLDER'S RIGHT TO VOTE AND SHAREHOLDER
COERCION

A.

The Shareholder'sLegal and Statutory Right to Vote

Delaware courts declare shareholder voting as the fundamental value
of corporate governance."' In the corporate structure provided by all state
corporation statutes, directors manage the business and affairs of the
corporation.' Essentially, directors have unfettered power to act on behalf
of the corporate entity with relatively few limitations.' In contrast,
shareholders participate only infrequently in a limited set of corporate
decisions. ' As a court decision from early in the twentieth century
explains, "[shareholders] are not ...given general power of initiative in

corporate affairs. Any action by them relating to the details of the
corporate business is necessarily in the form of assent, request, or
recommendation."' 59

153. Brazen, 695 A.2d at 49.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
156. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 8.01 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit
8, § 141 (2001).
157. See DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001).
158. See id.
By statute, common shareholders have the right to vote (at annual or specially called
meetings) for the election of directors and on certain "fundamental matters." Under most
state statutes, the "fundamental" matters that require a common shareholder vote include: (1) mergers involving the corporation (except, under some statutes, when the corporation acquires a much smaller firm), (2) any amendment to the certificate of incorporation, (3) the sale of substantially all the corporation's assets, and (4) liquidation.
WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BusINESs ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 119
(6th ed. 1996).
159. Continental Sees. Co. v. Belmont, 99 N.E. 138, 141 (N.Y. 1912).
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While the authority of shareholders is extremely limited in the
scheme of corporate governance, shareholders are afforded an exercise of
voting power when management entertains fundamental corporate
changes.'60 Delaware courts have consistently made statements that
strongly present the need to protect the shareholder franchise in this
regard. In Blasius Industries,Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,' the court noted that the
shareholder vote is the "ideological underpinning upon which the
legitimacy of directorial power rests.' 62 Moreover, the voting
exercise of
63
shareholders was said to have "transcending significance.'
In Blasius, directors attempted to purposely intrude on the
shareholders' right to elect a new board. The Delaware Court of Chancery
created a standard of review for application in this special context.' The
standard of review that Blasius established stated that, when directors act
with the primary purpose of encumbering the shareholders' exercise of
their voting power, the directors bear an arduous burden of demonstrating
a "compelling justification" for their action.' 65 While this "compelling
justification" standard has been criticized for its lack of utility,'6 the
Blasius decision "reaffirmed the traditional view that director actions
160. See Fanto, supra note 53, at 308. Note that a corporation conducting an acquisition can avoid
the requirement of shareholder approval by conducting the transaction through a special acquisition
subsidiary established for this purpose, the "triangular merger." However, most mergers do require the
approval of the shareholders of the acquiring company. See id. Interestingly enough, in a recent
European Union directive on takeovers, European corporate law experts from seven European
countries recommended measures that would place the decision of using defensive and protective
tactics in the hands of the shareholders. See EU Panel Recommends Measures to Foster Cross-Border
Mergers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2002, at A7. Corporate boards would have to receive shareholder
approval before instituting these mechanisms. See id. If the expert recommendations are adopted many
of the European Union countries would have to make changes to their takeover laws. See id.
161. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
162. Id. at 659.
163. Id. at 662.
164. See generally id.
165. Id. at 661.
166. See Allen et al. supranote 69, at 1312-13 (criticizing the practicality-but not the underlying
principle of protecting the shareholder franchise-of the Blasius standard of review). The Chancellors
further stated,
[T]he Blasius doctrine evolved into a flexible standard that functionally looks very much
like the Unocal/Unitrin standard, but with a strong emphasis on the importance of the
franchise. The post-Blasiusexperience has shown that presentations to the court were not
made clearer, nor were helpful analytical solutions suggested, by the addition of a
Blasius argument to a brief that already included a Unocal argument. The reason is that
after Unitrin, it is difficult to unearth or even imagine a case that would be decided
differently if the analysis were conducted under the Blasius rather than the Unocal
standard. Because the purpose underlying the Blasius standard is furthered equally well
by another, more easily applied, standard, Blasius should be eliminated as a "stand
alone" review doctrine.
Id. at 1312.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss4/7

24

Levy: Corporate Courtship Gone Sour: Applying a Bankruptcy Approach to
20021

TERMINATION FEE PROVISIONS

primarily motivated to effect a disenfranchisement have a dim chance of
being sustained."1' 67
Further, in Stroud v. Grace,'6 the court unequivocally stated that
"where boards of directors deliberately employ[] various legal strategies
either to frustrate or completely disenfranchise a shareholder
vote .... [t]here can be no dispute that such conduct violates Delaware
law.' 69 While the Delaware courts have certainly placed shareholder
voting rights on the highest pedestal, as their eloquent verbiage suggests,
they have not articulated a standard of review that demonstrates the
"transcending significance" of the shareholder vote, particularly in the
termination fee context where the problem of shareholder coercion
persists.Y°
A Delaware decision described the inadequacy of current judicial
standards best by stating, "[t]hat there are underlying policy issues is
inevitable, given the tension between the directors' acknowledged
authority to manage the affairs of the corporation, and the shareholders'
independent right and authority to choose the corporation's ultimate
destiny.' '71 Posing the question is a step in the right direction, but it is also
not answering it. The court proceeded to note, "[h]opefully, future cases
will provide the occasion to develop that jurisprudence. 7 The best
interest test this Note advocates in Part VI allows a court to examine a
termination fee provision without isolating the relevant factual
surroundings. Such a standard allows for judicial discretion in assessing
the issues arising out of the inclusion of termination fee provisions. This
standard is more conducive for providing the shareholder franchise with
the protection it so fittingly deserves.
B.

The Problem of ShareholderCoercion

Claims based on shareholder coercion have arisen in various
different contexts. These claims arise in corporate restructuring or
recapitalization, shareholder voting with respect to transactions involving
controlling shareholders, shareholder voting with respect to transactions

167. l at 1311-12 (footnote omitted).
168. 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
169. Id. at9l.
170. A specific discussion of shareholder coercion issues arising out of termination fee provisions
will be discussed infra Part V.B.
171. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 52 n.105 (Del. Ch.
1988), affd, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1988).
172. Id.
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not involving interested parties, and board responses to takeover
attempts. 73
'
The shareholder coercion issues involving termination fee provisions
are whether such fees "inequitably" or "wrongfully" coerce the
shareholders to vote in favor of the transaction.' 74 Generally, the party
bringing the suit will argue that the termination fee is so large as to coerce
shareholder approval of the transaction merely to avoid the exorbitant fee
that would be incurred by the company in the event the transaction was
not approved.17 Thus, the merits of the transaction are never truly
considered by the voting shareholders and the approving vote is coerced
by fear of76a punitive fee, making the vote ineffective and the transaction
voidable.
The defendant will counter by contending that the inclusion of the
termination fee provision was a crucial part of the deal and there was no
intention to use the fee to foster shareholder approval. 7 7 The defendant
corporation will likely defend the validity of the termination fee provision
by raising the business judgment rule defense. That is to say, the decision
to include the termination fee provision is a byproduct of an informed
directorial decision, thereby invoking the protection of the business
judgment rule. Additionally, the defendant will demonstrate that the
inclusion of the fee was a strategic decision proceeded by a cost-benefit
analysis that benefited the corporation,
in that it induced and offered
78
bidders.
potential
to
incentive
The shareholder coercion concern will increase as the incidence and
amount of termination fees increase. An empirical study conducted by
Professors John Coates and Guhan Subramanian illustrated the incidence
and magnitude of termination fee provisions.' 79 Figure 1 illustrates the
increasing popularity of termination fees over a twelve-year period of

173. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, The Doctrine of Inequitable Coercion Under
Delaware Law, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 1999, at 5.
174. See, e.g., Brazen v. BellAt. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49-50 (Del. 1997).
175. See generally id. (arguing that the termination fee provision in question coerces shareholder
approval of the transaction because of the risk of incurring the fee).
176. Indeed this concern is a genuine one. For instance, in a letter from Walter Hewlett to
Hewlett-Packard shareholders, Mr. Hewlett writes, "HP will NOT owe Compaq a $675 million breakup fee if HP stockholders just vote down the transaction." Walter Hewlett Sends Letter to HewlettPackardShareholders,PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14, 2002. This statement was also placed in a myriad of
advertisements in the Wall Street Journal as part of Mr. Hewlett's campaign against the merger. See
Attention: All Hewlett-PackardStockholders, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 19, 2002, at CI1. This demonstrates
the practical importance termination fee provisions play in shareholder voting considerations.
177. See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 49.
178. See, e.g., id. at 47.
179. See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 11.
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merger and acquisition activity, demonstrating that by 1998, termination
fee provisions were deployed in almost seventy percent of combination
transactions." 0
Figure 1: Termination Fee Incidence Over Time
80%
70%

60%
50%40% •30% 20%
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Furthermore, Figure 2 below illustrates the magnitude of termination
fee provisions over twelve years, as well as the seventy-fifth and twentyfifth percentile levels. Figure 2 demonstrates the upward trend of
termination fee provisions since 1995. Indeed, Professors Coates and
Subramanian postulate that absent judicial intervention, the size of
termination fees will increase in the future.' 8' Such a finding is
"consistent with the perceptions of practitioners who report a slight
increase in the size of [termination] fees over the past few years."' 82
Ultimately, the Professors contend that if the upward trend continues,
termination fees will become more coercive to shareholders. 3

180. See id. Figures 1 and 2 were recreated in substantial form from the empirical data graciously
provided by Professors Coates and Subramanian. I am grateful to Gary Moore for his technical
assistance in preparing these charts for publication.
181. Seeid. atl2.

182. See id. (citing specific practitioner interviews indicating the increasing magnitude of
termination fees).
183. See id. at 12 (explaining that the incidence and magnitude of termination fee provisions
increased after the Brazen case that dismissed the shareholder claim in the termination fee context).
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Figure 2: Termination Fee Magnitude Over Time
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There is no clear legal definition for the term "coercion." The term is
used in a variety of different legal contexts. In Williams v. Geier,'14 the
Delaware Supreme Court developed an analysis to determine whether
there had been impermissive shareholder coercion in a given situation.
The court stated that, "[a]n otherwise valid stockholder vote may be
nullified by a showing that the structure or circumstances of the vote were
impermissibly coercive."'85 The court further explained that "wrongful
coercion" can exist when the stockholders are caused "to vote in favor of
the proposed transaction for some reason other than the merits of that
transaction.' 86 The Geier case expressly states that the determination of
coercion depends on the specific factual context of each case and should
be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.8 7 The court in Geier, however, failed
to provide a test or standard in determining what constitutes shareholder
coercion.
Perhaps the shareholder coercion claim is strongest when the
termination fee in question is of the naked no vote breed. As mentioned,
this type of termination fee provision contemplates a scenario where there
has been a negative shareholder vote by the target's shareholders without

184.
185.
186.
187.

671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1382-83.
See id. at 1383.
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any competing bid affecting their voting decision.' The viability of a
substantial naked no vote provision has been doubtful in light of a recent
Chancery Court opinion, and rightfully so.
In McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 9 plaintiff shareholders sued their
former directors for breaching their fiduciary duties in connection with an
acquisition that had been consummated. 90 The plaintiffs argued that the
directors breached their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty as a result of
their failure to ensure the highest value reasonably attainable through the
acquisition. 9' The complaint further alleged that the merger agreement
contained a preclusive and coercive fee of $3.1 million plus expenses.9
The termination fee constituted approximately 3.5 percent of the $88
million value of the transaction. 9 3 The complaint also asserted that there
were two other bidders that were interested in negotiating a merger, if they
194
had the opportunity to do so.
In examining the termination fee provision, Vice Chancellor Strine
explained that although "the termination fee was at the high end of what
our courts have approved, it was still within the range that is generally
considered reasonable."'95 The Vice Chancellor placed emphasis on the
fact that the termination fee was conditioned upon the occurrence of two
contingent events-a negative shareholder vote and the target benefiting
from a more favorable transaction within ninety days or another
acquisition proposal within the year.'96 The Vice Chancellor continued to
explain how the termination fee provision "ensured that the Intercargo
stockholders would not cast their vote in fear that a no vote alone would
trigger the fee; the fee would be payable only if the stockholders were to
get a better deal."' 97 From Vice Chancellor Strine's justification of the
termination fee in question, his concern with the naked no vote provision

188. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
189. 768 A2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2000). The shareholders attempted to block consummation of the
merger but the Chancery Court rejected their request for a preliminary injunction. Chancellor Strine
described the failure to obtain the injunction rather artfully as he explained: "the metaphorical merger
eggs have been scrambled." Id. at 500.
190. See id. at 495.
191. See id.
192. See id. at498.
193. See id.
194. See id. 498-99.
195. Id. at 505.
196. See id.
197. See id.
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is alluded to. As a result of this intimation, practitioners have been wary of
sizable naked no vote provisions.'
Vice Chancellor Strine's concern with the naked no vote situation is
certainly warranted. As mentioned previously, the typical purpose of
negotiating a termination fee provision is to compensate the first bidder
when it serves as a stalking horse for the target to obtain a more favorable
transaction.'99 Thus, it is inherently inconsistent with this purpose, to
condition a termination fee solely on a negative shareholder vote.
Moreover, the Delaware statutory scheme expressly authorizes a
shareholder vote when corporations enter into combination transactions. °
Coercing or intruding on the shareholders' legal and statutory right to vote
by employing a naked no vote provision is certainly problematic as a
public policy matter. Under the substantive standard of review this Note
advocates, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to uphold a naked no
vote termination fee provision. Such an outcome would be consistent with
the primacy of the shareholders' right to make a free and meaningful
choice.
If courts apply the best interest standard discussed, courts will be
able to scrutinize the substance of termination fee provisions and come to
an informed conclusion regarding what fees impermissibly coerce
fundamental shareholder voting and what fees do not. Such a standard is
consistent with the Delaware judiciary's high regard for the shareholder
franchise. This application would narrow the chasm between the rhetoric
of Delaware courts and their actual decisions.
VI.

TERMINATION FEE PROVISIONS N BANKRUPTCY ASSET SALES

While termination fee provisions originated in the context of
corporate mergers and acquisitions, such fees are included in bankruptcy
asset purchase agreements."' A corporation in bankruptcy may wish to

198. See Richard E. Climan et al., Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies, 10 U. MIAMI
Bus. L. REv. 219,267-68 (2002).
199. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
200. See supra Part V.A.
201. The first case to address the validity of these provisions in bankruptcy was In re 995 Fifth
Avenue Associates, 96 B.R. 24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (upholding the payment of a $500,000
termination fee). It is important to note that termination fees are not addressed in the Federal
Bankruptcy Code. There have been various bankruptcy code sections proposed by scholars. Most
notable is the proposal of Paul Lackey convincingly advocating the adoption of an ex ante approach to
determining the propriety of termination fees. See Paul B. Lackey, Note, All Empirical Survey and
Proposed Banknptcy Code Section Concerning the Propriety of Bidding Incentives in a Banknptcy
Sale ofAssets, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 720,743 (1993).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss4/7

30

Levy: Corporate Courtship Gone Sour: Applying a Bankruptcy Approach to
20021

TERMINATION FEE PROVISIONS

sell its assets in order to pay off its debts. 2 The debtor may attempt to sell
the assets by public auction.0 3 If such an auction does not yield the best
price available, the debtor may attempt to sell its assets by private sale.20 4
In both transactions, the debtor will tentatively agree with a buyer as to a
particular sale.205 Both private and public sales require approval from a
bankruptcy court.2° In a Chapter 11 case, the debtor strives to gain court
confirmation of a plan of reorganization0 that will give the debtor a fresh
start, and relieve the debtor from most debts he or she incurred prior to the

bankruptcy. 203
A bankruptcy court will confirm the sale only if it is convinced that
the price to be paid is the best price under the circumstances. 2°9 The delay
in awaiting court approval, coupled with the possibility that the sale will
not be approved, may lead potential purchasers to insist that the debtor
pay termination fees if the court instead approves a competing bid. °
Termination fee provisions in bankruptcy asset-purchase agreements
function virtually in the same manner as they do in merger and acquisition
agreements. Potential purchasers are reluctant to incur the costs to engage
in the due diligence necessary to determine the worth of the debtor's
business and prepare the first bid.' The same looming possibility of other
purchasers relying on that work and making a higher bid, discussed
previously, exists in the bankruptcy context.21 2 Consequently, debtors

202. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1994) (providing that the trustee, after notice and a hearing, may
sell, use, or lease property of the estate, other than in the ordinary course of business).
203. The Bankruptcy Rules permit sale by public auction. See FED. R. BANKR. P. § 6004(f)(1)
(2002).
204. The Bankruptcy Rules also pemit private sales of estate assets. See id.
205. See I I U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1994).
206. See id.
207. The reorganization of a corporation commonly occurs when a corporation is approaching the
point of bankruptcy or insolvency. The purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization is to "assist financially
stressed business enterprises by providing them with breathing space in which to return to a viable
state." In re C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship, 113 F.3d 1304, 1309 (2d Cir. 1997).
208. See Robert J. Rosenberg & A. Brent Truitt, hnvestors See Both Risk and Opportunity,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 13, 1999, at 13. There is an exception to the rule that a Chapter 11 debtor receives a
discharge of debts. Section 1141(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that if a corporate debtor sells
all or substantially all of its assets and will not carry on any business after the chapter eleven case is
concluded, then the debtor does not get a discharge. See 1 U.S.C. § 1141 (1993).
209. See In re Chung King, Inc., 753 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating the general goal of
bankruptcy sales is to obtain the best price); hi re Fin. News Network, Inc., 126 B.R. 152, 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that failure to consider a superior bid did not meet the court's "paramount
obligation" of determining the highest and best bid.
210. See Lackey, supra note 201, at 722.
211. See h re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 193-94 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (discussing the
various functions of termination fees).
212. See id.
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provide termination fees as an economic incentive to bolster the bidding
process.13 While termination fees compensate the buyer for the risk of
being outbid, they may concomitantly deter others from making bids.2 4
A.

Bankruptcy Court Standards of Review

Bankruptcy courts have applied various standards in determining the
permissibility of termination fees. In applying these standards, the courts
are especially concerned with "prevent[ing] potential acquirors from
obtaining undue advantages to the detriment of the bankrupt company's
creditors and shareholders." 25 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the
paramount consideration of bankruptcy courts is to obtain the highest and
best price for what is being sold.21 6
When confronted with termination fee requests, some bankruptcy
courts... have applied a modified business judgment rule. 28 The
termination fee will be approved if the agreement to provide the fee
represents the proper exercise of the debtor's judgment. Indeed, the first
bankruptcy court confronted with the question of what standard of review
to apply opted to review the fee "by analogy" to termination fee
provisions in the corporate merger and acquisition context. 2"9 The
modified version of the business judgment rule is best explained in the
seminal IntegratedResources case. 220
213. Courts recognize that termination fees may enhance the bidding process by encouraging the
initial bid. Termination fees may "be legitimately necessary to convince a 'white knight' to enter the
bidding by providing some form of compensation for the risks it is undertaking." Samjens Partners I v.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndreiws &
Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182-84 (Del. 1986)). On the other hand, termination fees may
discourage others from making bids by increasing the cost of the acquisition. See id.
214. Termination fees "are designed to protect the transaction for the acquirer, to make it more
expensive for any third party to enter the bidding after an agreement has been announced, and to ensure
the initial putative acquirer that it will be appropriately compensated if such should occur." LORNE,
supra note 32, § 2:23.
215. John J. Jerome & Robert D. Drain, Bankruptcy Court is Nevest Arena for M & A Action,
N.Y.L.J., June 3, 1991, at8.
216. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
217. Most courts in the Second Circuit, which encompasses the Southern District of New York
where most "mega-cases" are filed, apply this modified business judgment rule. See S.ELIZABETH
GIBSON, A GUIDE TO THE JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF BANKRUPTCY MEGA-CASES (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed.
1992) (defining "mega-cases" as a bankruptcy involving a debtor of at least $100 million).
218. See In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 96 B.R. 24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). In 995 Fifth
Ave., the
court considered whether the proposed termination fee prohibited or had a chilling effect on bidding
and whether the amount of the proposed fee was reasonable in relation to the size of the sale, the work,
and the expense involved in negotiating the agreements to determine if the fee met the modified
business judgment rule. See id.
219. See id. at 28.
220. 147 B.R. 650 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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In IntegratedResources, Banker's Trust made a proposal to fund a
reorganization plan for the debtor, Integrated, which included a
termination fee provision."' The court began its analysis by stating that the
primary responsibility of the debtor seeking to sell its assets is the
maximization of the value of the assets. 2 Furthermore, the court imposed
the burden of proving that the purchase price was the highest and best
offer on the debtor.22 The court concluded that the modified business
judgment rule was the appropriate standard of review in the evaluation of
termination fees.
In applying the modified business judgment rule, the court
established a three-part test for bankruptcy courts to apply in their
examination of termination fees: "(1) is the relationship of the parties who
negotiated the break-up fee tainted by self-dealing or manipulation;
(2) does the fee hamper, rather than encourage, bidding; (3) is the amount
of the fee unreasonable relative to the proposed purchase price?" The
court concluded that the termination fee was economically appropriate
because it attracted a potentially successful bid, it established a bidding
standard for subsequent bidders, and it served to attract additional
bidders.2 6
In the corporate merger and acquisition context, a court's analysis
would generally begin by focusing on whether the decision to accept a
termination fee provision was a "sweetheart deal" 227 and whether any fraud
was present.m Under the business judgment rule, absence of bad faith or
gross negligence in the decision to accept such a provision would be
presumptively valid.229 The analysis would then cease2 0 In the bankruptcy
context, the Second Circuit has modified the deferential business
judgment standard and required that the fee be reasonable and encourage
rather than deter bidding2'
The bankruptcy decision in Integrated Resources failed to explain
precisely why the court decided to modify the business judgment standard.
221. Seeid at653.
222. See id. at 659.
223. See id.
224. See id.at 656.
225. Id. at 657.
226. See id.at 662.
227. A sweetheart deal is defined as "[a] collusive agreement" usually tainted with self-dealing.
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1462 (7th ed. 1999).
228. See supra Part III.A.
229. See id.
230. As discussed in Part Ill supra, a court may apply Unocal's enhanced scrutiny or Brazen's
liquidated damages approach.
231. See Hebbeln, supra note 11, at 485.
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Perhaps the reason for this modification is that bankruptcy courts have
acknowledged that the decision to include termination fees requires more
scrutiny, since there are several parties involved in these transactions, each
pursuing their own interests. While the modified business judgment rule
seems to provide an "extra layer of protection" for creditors, debtors and
shareholders alike,2 2 the standard is premised on the deferential
conceptualizations of the business judgment rule. The foundation for this
standard of review is inconsistent with the overarching policy
consideration of protecting the shareholder franchise. A superlative
standard of review would better take into account the statutory role of the
shareholders in the combination transaction context. The best interest
standard discussed later in this Note, if adopted analogously, does
precisely that.
B. In re Hupp Industries

3

and the Best Interest Standard

While the modified business judgment rule is the standard of review
in the Second Circuit, many bankruptcy courts have rejected the
IntegratedResources test.3 4 Rather than being concerned with the debtor's
business judgment, these courts apply a more stringent standard that
focuses on whether the termination fees make economic sense and
whether the fees benefit the bankruptcy estate.25 The underlying rationale
232. Id.
233. 140 B.R. 191 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
234. See In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98, 102-03 (Bankr. N.D. 111.1995) (rejecting the business
judgment rule as the correct standard to apply to termination fees); In re Tiara Motorcoach Corp., 212
B.R. 133, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997) (rejecting the IntegratedResources modified business judgment
rule); In re Hupp Indus., 140 B.R. at 194 (establishing a seven-factor test to apply to termination fee
provisions though not explicitly rejecting the business judgment rule).
235. See In re Hupp Indus., 140 B.R. at 194, 196. Another standard of review applied by
bankruptcy courts that is not mentioned in the above discussion of bankruptcy court standards of
review is the "administrative expense" standard. See I re O'Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527
(3d Cir. 1999). In O'Brien, the Third Circuit established standards for determining the appropriateness
of termination fee provisions in the bankruptcy context. See id. at 535-38. The O'Brien court held that
even though bidding incentives, such as termination fees are generally measured against a business
judgment standard in nonbankruptcy transactions, the administrative expense provisions of § 503(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code govern in the bankruptcy context. See id. at 535. Accordingly, in order for a
termination fee to be approved, the fee must provide some benefit to the debtor's estate. See id. at 533.
The O'Brien Court identified at least two circumstances in which termination fees may provide benefit
for the estate. First, a benefit may be found if "assurance of a [termination] fee promoted more
competitive bidding, such as by inducing a bid that otherwise would not have been made and without
which bidding would have been limited." Id. at 537. Second, where the availability of termination fees
induces a bidder to research the value of the debtor and submit a bid that serves as a minimum floor
bid, on which other bidders will rely to formulate their own bid, "the bidder may have provided a
benefit to the estate by increasing the likelihood that the price at which the debtor is sold will reflect its
true worth." Id. As will be discussed infra, the argument that termination fees induce a bidder to
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for adopting this standard is that the paramount purpose of the bankruptcy
sale is to maximize the value of the estate and, therefore, the payment of a
termination fee may unnecessarily decrease the value. 6
The seminal case applying the best interest of the estate test was In re
Hupp Industries, Inc. 7 The termination fee at issue in Hupp was unusual
as the agreement provided for $100,000 to be paid to the bidder whether
or not the bidder was successful in its purchase of the debtor. 3 The court
held that, although termination fees are "presumptively appropriate" in the
merger and acquisition context, courts in the bankruptcy context "must be
necessarily wary of any potential detrimental effect that an allowance of
such a fee would visit upon the debtor's estate." 29 In assessing the
propriety of the termination fee, the Hupp court introduced a seven-factor
best interest test:
1) Whether the fee requested correlates with a maximization of value
to the debtor's estate;
2) Whether the underlying negotiated agreement is an arms-length
transaction between the debtor's estate and the negotiating acquirer;
3) Whether the principal secured creditors and the official creditors
committee are supportive of the concession;
4) Whether the subject [termination] fee constitutes a fair and reasonable percentage of the proposed purchase price;
5) Whether the dollar amount of the [termination] fee is so substantial
that it provides a "chilling effect" on other potential bidders;
6) The existence of available safeguards beneficial to the debtor's estate; [and]
7) Whether there exists a substantial adverse impact upon unsecured
where such creditors are in opposition to the [termination]
creditors,
2 40
fee.

research the value of an entity is refutable on the basis that debtors (or targets) can eliminate the need
for termination fees by increasing the available information about itself. See Markell, supra note 59,
at 386.
236. See I,re Hupp Indus., 140 B.R. at 194.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 195.
239. Id. at 194.
240. Id.
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Ultimately, the court rejected the termination fee because it was
unrelated to any costs incurred by the potential purchaser and because the
fee was to be paid regardless of whether the bidder acquired the debtor.24
Similarly, in In re America West Airlines, Inc., 242 the court expressly
rejected the business judgment rule as a standard of reviewing termination
fee provisions.243 The court stated that the proper analysis must "include a
determination that all aspects of the transaction are in the best interests of
all concerned." 2 In applying the best interest of the estate standard, the
court reasoned that the debtor had been extensively marketed and, thus,
the termination fee "[would] not induce further bidding or bidding
generally." 24
The court, in In re Tiara Motorcoach Corp.,6 also applied the best
interest of the estate standard. The court invalidated the termination fee on
the grounds that there was no evidence suggesting that the party
requesting the fee had conducted any due diligence that other entities
relied on or benefited from.24' Further, the court held that the termination
fee did not "serve and protect the interests of the estate, creditors and
equity holders,"
and that the termination fee "arrangement would chill
248
bidding."
Of special interest is the reasoning of the Tiara court in expressly
adopting the more stringent standard. The court reasoned that a
bankruptcy sale is not in the ordinary course of business, and thus "the
business judgment of the debtor should not be solely relied upon.2 1 49 An
analogy can be drawn from this rationale to the corporate merger and
acquisition context. While directors in care of a corporation enjoy the
protection of the business judgment rule, the scope of this deference
should be limited when directors are confronted with fundamental
corporate changes, particularly in deciding whether to accept termination
fee provisions that may significantly affect the shareholder franchise.
Delaware Chancery courts that assess termination fee provisions in
acquisition agreements should adopt a test that is similar to the best
interest of the estate test. Ideally, such a test would take into consideration
the totality of the circumstances as the best interest test indeed endeavors
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Seeid. at195.
166 B.R. 908 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
Seeid. at912.
Id.
Id. at 913.
212 B.R. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997).
See id. at 138 n.7.
Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 137.
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to accomplish. The following Part will establish how the best interest test
will operate in the combination transaction context.
C. The Best Interests of the Shareholders:Substantive Review of
TerminationFee Provisions
As mentioned previously, once it becomes evident that a corporation
will be acquired, the duty of the board shifts from the preservation of the
corporate entity to maximization of the price to be obtained for the
shareholders.2' 0 This notion of maximizing the shareholder value by
obtaining the best price mirrors the bedrock bankruptcy goal of
maximizing the debtor's estate. Bankruptcy courts have recognized an
inconsistency with this principle when applying the deferential business
judgment rule standard251 They sought to protect the value of the debtor's
estate by adopting a more rigorous standard.2. Similarly, the Delaware
courts should protect the notions of maximizing shareholder value and
safeguarding the shareholder franchise by enacting a similar standard.
The core concern of the Delaware courts should center on whether
the termination fee provision is in the best interests of the shareholders,
and the series of factors established by the Hupp court does precisely that.
The factors articulated by the Hupp court attempt to look beyond the mere
decision-making process, and into the actual substance of the termination
fee and how it functions in the business environment. An analysis into the
substance of directorial action is not without precedent.2 3 In a recent
decision involving the disputed merger of Wachovia and First Union, the
North Carolina Business Court applied an analysis that substantively
reviewed the directors' actions that involved adopting defensive and deal
protection provisions including a termination fee.'
After finding that the board of directors met its fiduciary duty of care
in adopting certain provisions into a merger agreement, the court
considered whether those provisions interfered with the shareholders' vote
on the merger. 5 In justifying its entry into the realm of substantive
review, the court stated "[t]he business judgment rule ...lets some legal

250. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
251. See generallyIn re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. 191 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
252. See generally id.
253. See generally First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, 01 CVS 4486,
01 CVS 8036, 2001 NCBC 09 (Super. Ct. N.C. Amended Aug. 10, 2001); see also Allen et al., supra
note 69 at 1299-1301; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal ProtectionMeasures in Stockfor-Stock Merger Agreements, 56 BUs. LAw. 919, 926-31 (2001).
254. See generally FirstUnion Corp., 2001 NCBC 09.
255. See, e.g.,id.S 161.
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rights go unredressed for the sake of the efficiency of the system. When
the legal rights are statutory shareholder rights, 'sacred space,' the review
process should not permit these legal rights to go unredressed. ' 5' 6 In
support of the court's review, recent commentary suggests that "to the
extent that deal protection measures do affect the integrity of stockholder
votes, there must be judicial review to '2insure
that the integrity of the
7
stockholder voting process is maintained.
The termination fee provision in First Union prevented Wachovia, a
party to the merger agreement, from terminating the agreement, thereby
extending the life of the agreement for five months beyond the
5 8 The purpose of this provision
shareholder vote against the transaction."
was to delay any further action after an adverse shareholder vote.25 9 The
court explained the problematic and coercive nature of the termination fee
and how it would create looming uncertainties for Wachovia
shareholders.26
The termination fee provision left the shareholders with either the
option of voting in approval of the merger, or disapproving the merger and
"run[ning] the risk that something will happen in the ensuing five months
that will be disadvantageous in light of the directors' inability to respond
to any offers. 26' Moreover, the court explained that contractually limiting
the ability of the directors to act created uncertainty for the shareholders
and this directorial action made it more likely that the shareholders were
to "vote for the bird in the hand. 262 Ultimately, the provision resulted in
the inability of other suitors to get a proposal before the board, and the
shareholders were required to vote knowing that this transaction was the
only opportunity they will have to sell for five months. The court plainly
concluded, "[tihat is coercive." '63
The First Union court was undoubtedly influenced by recent
scholarship of former and current Delaware Chancellors. 264 In a recent
article Vice-Chancellor Strine argues that judicial emphasis should be
placed on the uncoerced shareholder choice as such an approach more
adequately balances the competing pressures of directors and
shareholders in the merger setting. The Vice-Chancellor stated:
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. 153 (footnote omitted).
Alexander, supra note 17, at 903 (footnote omitted).
See First Union Corp., 2001 NCBC, 155.
See id. 159.
See id. 161.
Id.
Id.
Id. 162.
See id.%67; see generallyAllen et al., supra note 69; Strine, supra note 253.
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[the] judicial emphasis on stockholder choice makes sense. It gives
boards the first bite at the apple and contractual tools to use to accomplish their preferred strategy. It enables the merger partners to receive
contractual protections that limit their injuries if transactions do not go
through. But it also ensures integrity by limiting the boards' ability to
intrude on the stockholders' co-equal right to approve mergers.265
The First Union court expressly adopted the Vice-Chancellor's policy
considerations in formulating its analysis.2
In another article exploring standard of review uncertainties in
Delaware, former Chancellor Allen with Vice-Chancellors Strine and
Jacobs endorsed a substantive review of certain board actions and
emphasized the necessity to broaden judicial review for the purpose of
better protecting uncoerced shareholder votes.2 67 The Chancellors
contemplated what is necessary for a standard of review to achieve the
lofty goal of "functionality. '268 A functional standard of review must do
three things:
(i) provide judges with a practical and logical framework to determine
whether corporate directors have fulfilled their duties in a particular
context and the appropriate remedies if they have not;
(ii) avoid needless complexity that creates opportunities for inefficient
processing of cases that have little likelihood of ultimate success; and
(iii) be aligned with the public policies that animate the corporate law
by providing incentives for directors to act in a manner most likely to
advance corporate and stockholder interests, and by deferring to outcomes reached through effective intra-corporate dispute resolution
mechanisms.' 69
While the First Union standard embraced many of these
considerations, it does have its shortcomings.2 0 The analysis in First
Union did not adequately assess the negotiations of the Wachovia and
265. Strine, supra note 253, at 942.
266. See id.First Union Corp., 2001 NCBC, 68.
267. See generally Allen etal., supra note 69; Strine, supranote 253.
268. See Allen et al., supra note 69, at 1297.
269. Id. (footnote omitted).
270. See, e.g., Paul A. Kuebler, Recent Development: First Union v. SunTrust and the Delaware
Experience: An Analysis of Deal ProtectionMeasures, 80 N.C. L. REV. 2109, 2120 (criticizing the
First Union opinion as "[oversimplifying] the realities surrounding deal protection provisions and
fail[ing] to establish a tri-leveled system of review, with increasing levels of scrutiny applied as the
potential for director conflict of interest increases").
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First Union boards in determining whether to uphold the termination fee.
While this Note has argued that the Delaware courts should look to the
substance of a termination fee provision, it is also necessary to examine
the board's decision-making process, an important component that is
contemplated by the Hupp court's analysis. The totality of the
circumstances analysis the Hupp court established, if comparably applied
in the merger context, addresses the longstanding Delaware policies of
advancing the shareholder interest and concomitantly provides incentives
for responsible directorial action.
The seven-factor analysis of the Hupp court can be adopted
analogously as follows:
(1) Whether the termination fee correlates with the maximization of value
to the shareholders;
(2) Whether the underlying negotiated agreement is an arms-length
transaction between the merger partners;
(3) Whether the directors followed a reasonable decision-making process;
(4) Whether the termination fee constitutes a fair and reasonable
percentage of the proposed purchase price;
(5) Whether the dollar amount of the termination fee is so substantial that
it deters or chills other potential bidders;
(6) Whether other provisions exist in the merger agreement that are
detrimental to the shareholders; and
(7) Whether there is a substantial adverse impact to the shareholder's legal
and statutory right to vote.
Practitioners may criticize the application of such a standard as being
incoherent and lacking bright-line guidelines. The response to this
common criticism was captured in a recent statement of Chief Justice
Veasey of the Delaware Supreme Court. The Chief Justice explained that
"it is impracticable to devise a bright-line regulatory scheme that could:
1) adequately cover the vast corporate landscape, 2) prevent
circumvention by unscrupulous actors, and 3) keep pace with changes in
corporate governance, takeover strategies and defenses, and financial
devices., 27 ' Additionally, in discussing takeover jurisprudence dealing
with deal protections, Veasey continued, "[a]t the heart of any
jurisprudence in this area should be a concern for the best interests of
stockholders. 272 The best interest of the shareholders standard this Note
advocates is flexible enough to accommodate the Chief Justice's

271. Veasey, supra note 24, at 2.
272. Id. at 9.
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significant concerns and provides courts with a practical framework of
inquiries to be applied.
This analysis is consistent with the fundamental premise of corporate
law-the notion that "the legitimacy of [the] director['s] action derives
from the vote of the shareholders. 273 It comports to those policies that
"animate" corporate law, informed board decisions and protection of
shareholder rights. Merely applying the business judgment rule or one of
its subsequent derivations will not achieve this responsible and desired
outcome.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Initially, bankruptcy courts applied the business judgment rule to
termination fee provisions by drawing from the long-standing
jurisprudence of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Thereafter, the
bankruptcy courts rejected the deferential standard as being inadequate
and adopted the more appropriate best interest framework. The time has
come for the Delaware courts to reach a similar conclusion. The Delaware
Chancellors have recognized a need for substantive review of certain
board action and the First Union court attempted to apply such an
analysis. In doing so, the First Union court correctly opined, "refocusing
on the relationship between shareholder rights and directors ... would be
[]helpful. 274
The tension between deference to directorial action and the scope of
judicial review has been dubbed "[t]he defining tension in corporate
governance." 275 This tension is especially provoked when termination fee
provisions and other deal protections are adopted into merger agreements.
The business judgment rule, enhanced Unocal review, and Brazen's
liquidated damages analysis are inadequate responses to this tension
because they each fail to address the two pillars on which the corporate
law is erected-the sanctities of shareholder value and franchise, and the
discretion afforded to directors to act in an informed and responsible
manner. If adopted analogously to examine termination fees in the
combination transaction context, the Hupp analysis will address this
tension by focusing judicial review on these policies that Delaware courts
have long held in the highest regard.

273. Loewenstein, supranote 98, at 25.
274. First Union Corp. v. SunTmst Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, 01 CVS 4486, 01 CVS 8036,
2001 NCBC 09 (Super. Ct. N.C. Amended Aug. 10, 2001).
275. See E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52
BUS. LAW. 393,403 (1997).
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This Note has demonstrated that it is inconsistent to apply judicial
standards of review that fail to take into account shareholder value and
franchise, particularly to board actions accepting termination fee
provisions that could render the statutory right of shareholders a practical
nullity. Indeed, the economic benefits of termination fees may be genuine,
however, such a determination would depend on each individual factual
scenario. Simply presuming the validity of a termination fee and divorcing
the fee from its factual context is an inadequate way of assessing the
important policy considerations that courts of equity are charged with
administering. Applying a best interest of the shareholders standard takes
into account the totality of the circumstances and more adequately
addresses the increasing tension between shareholders and directors in the
merger and acquisition context.
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